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1CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
Introductory Remarks
This thesis concerns the historical development of interest theories prior to the
twentieth century. Specifically, it deals with the interest theory of two writers: Nassau
Senior, and Eugen Von Bohm Bawerk.
Although the writings of these two economists are separated by almost fifty
years, they both attempted to grapple with the same problem, that of interest. That is,
they investigate why interest is paid, and what determines its level.
In dealing with the problem of interest, Bohm Bawerk first provides a critique
of interest theories of writers prior to him, then devises his own theory. In doing so,
he criticizes Senior's "abstinence theory" of interest. The main subject dealt with in
this thesis is this criticism.
There is no doubt in my mind that Bohm Bawerk was a remarkable historian
of economic thought as well as economic theorist. But my goal in this thesis is to
look at Bohm Bawerk's criticism of Senior, and evaluate it.
Many historians of economic thought often mention Bohm Bawerk's criticism
of Senior when dealing with their theories, often writing only a sentence or a
paragraph on the subject, or putting it in a foomote. I intend to provide a
comprehensive study of Senior and Bohm Bawerk, focusing on their interest theories.
After doing this, I will discuss Bohm Bawerk's criticism of Senior, and evaluate it.
Since this is a study in the history of economic thought, much of what I say
2can be found in journal articles or textbooks. However, I hope to provide a concise
comparison of these writers, focusing on Bohm Bawerk's criticism of Senior, which
cannot readily be found in texts on the subject.
Outline of the Work
This work is divided into four main chapters, and a concluding chapter. The
second chapter is a review of the various types of interest theories, other than the
abstinence theory of interest. The third chapter deals with the abstinence theory, and
in panicular, the theory of Senior. The fourth chapter concerns the interest theory of
Bohm Bawerk. The foundation for comparison complete, the fifth chapter presents a
brief comparison of the writers, and explains Bohm Bawerk's criticism of Senior. In
addition, the evaluation of Bohm Bawerk's criticism is given here. The last chapter
contains a synopsis of the whole work.
3CHAPTER II. A REVIEW OF INTEREST THEORIES
Introduction
To review all of the various theories regarding interest would be beyond the
scope of this work. However, it is important to understand that there are many
different theories of why interest exists. This chapter is intended to be a brief survey
of interest theories from the physiocrats up to the writing of Eugen Von Bohm
Bawerk.
Prior to discussing these interest theories, it should be pointed out that in the
writing of classical political economy, the terms profit and interest are often used
interchangeably. I also use the terms interest and profit to indicate the return accrued
from the use of capital in production. I use the term loan interest in order to denote
the return from a money loan. My word choice throughout is dictated by the author
being discussed. If I intend to use the terms interest or profit in ways inconsistent
with a particular author, it shall be pointed out.
Interest Theory Prior to the Physiocrats'
Prior to the sixteenth century, interest theory was practically nonexistent.
During the ancient times of Plato and Aristotle, loan interest was considered unjust
because money was thought to serve exclusively as a medium of exchange. They
believed that money could not breed money. The Christian Church of the middle ages
prohibited loan interest for three main reasons. Canonist doctrine asserted that loans
were made to the poor by the rich and thus represented exploitation of the poor. In
addition, interest represented the price of the "use" of money, and the price of "time",
4both of which could not be sold. Thirdly, the canonists also believed that money
could not breed money. These canonist objections, interestingly enough, only applied
to money loans, not the loan of capital goods.
Due to the writings of Calvin, Salmasius, Locke and numerous others, the
taking of interest eventually became justified during the sixteenth century. The
reasons for this are twofold. First, it was thought that money could in fact breed
money if it were put to productive use. Secondly, it was thought that the use
associated with money was a separate entity from the money itself, and could be sold
for a price. However, these writers did not devise a definite theory of interest, they
only justified the payment of it. The first theory of interest originated from the
physiocrats.
Interest Theory of the Physiocrats
By most accounts, Turgot was the first and only physiocrat to justify interest
on all capital and develop an interest theory.^ Physiocratic doctrine held that the
source of all wealth was the agricultural powers of the land. The result is that most
physiocrats believed interest could only be charged on capital used for agricultural
purposes. Turgot opposed this and justified interest on all capital. Turgot's argument
proposed that any owner of a capital sum could either purchase land from which he
would receive a rent, or he could invest it in commercial enterprises in order to
receive interest.^ If interest on ordinary commercial enterprises were prohibited, this
would induce capital owners to invest only in agricultural enterprises, or purchase
land. If land was able to give rent, then capital should be able to give interest. Loan
5interest can be seen as the rent of money for a certain period of time.
Amazingly, Turgot seems to have explained a great many of the ideas which
classical writers later adhered to when developing theories on interest rate
determination. Turgot said that loan interest is not determined by the expected rate of
profit on capital. The rate of loan interest is determined by bargaining between the
lender £ind the borrower. The borrower is concerned with the amount of profit that he
can make, while the lender is concerned with the risk of the loan."^ Turgot can be
seen as the writer who paved the way for the classical writers after him.
Adam Smith and David Ricardo on Interest
Before discussing the various interest theories, along with some of the writers
who supported those theories, it is important to know that two of the founders of
classical political economy, Adam Smith and David Ricardo, had weak interest
theories. These two writers did mention interest in their works, but their thoughts on
the subject are often scattered and contradictory. Even though these writers express
ideas which could conceivably classify them under some of the theories to be
discussed, the ideas are arranged in such a chaotic manner that many historians of
economic thought do not consider the ideas to be a coherent theory.
Adam Smith, according to Schumpeter, Taylor, and others,^ did not hold a
definite theory of interest. Although Smith discusses profit, his discussion of loan
interest is all but nonexistent.
In book one, chapter eight, of The Wealth of Nations. Smith explains that in
the rude state of society prior to the appropriation of land and the accumulation of
6stock, the laborer gets all of his produce.® Once land is appropriated, and capital is
accumulated, part of the laborers produce is striped from him by the landowner and
capitalist. This suggests a hint of the exploitation theory of interest, which is
discussed later.
In book two, chapter three of The Wealth of Nations. Smith says that
"parsimony, and not industry is the immediate cause of the increase in capital."^
Profit can be seen as a payment to the capitalist for his frugality, suggesting an
abstinence theory of interest.
These are some of the ways that Smith has been interpreted with regard to the
origin of interest. Because the abstinence theory rests on the assumption that value is
determined by the cost of production, where the factor prices are determined by supply
and demand, and the exploitation theory is consistent only with the labor theory of
value, one must first decide how to interpret Smith's theory of value, before assigning
a theory of interest to him.
Smith, like other classical writers, believes that profits are composed of the
capitalist wages, a risk premium, and loan interest. The result is that the market rate
of loan interest and profit must be positively correlated. Profit is determined by the
competition of capitalists and is positively related to risk. In the progression of
society, capital is increased, which results in lower profits. If the wage fund increases
at a faster rate than the population, wages go up, resulting in lower profits. Thus
profits and wages vary inversely.®
Smith has not left us with much regarding interest. He mentions many ideas
7which are expanded on by later writers, but he adheres to none of them throughout the
work.
Like Smith, David Ricardo has been subjected to many interpretations with
regard to interest. One interpretation is that since Ricardo held a labor theory of
value, capital can be seen as stored labor, and interest represents a payment to this
stored labor. A second interpretation is that Ricardo, like Smith, hinted at an
abstinence theory. As Whitaker points out, Ricardo understood that goods which are
produced with the same amount of labor, but brought to market at a separate time,
may have differing exchange values.^
I think that although Ricardo had no theory of loan interest, he did have a
theory pertaining to the rate of profit. With respect to loan interest he says that the
market rate of interest is subject to various fluctuations, but is "ultimately and
permanendy governed by the race of profit"'®, but does not really explain the
workings of the money market." His theory of profit can be described as what
Schumpeter calls a "residual theory".'^ In Ricardo's system profits are affected by
wages. Ricardo believes that the value of a good was determined by the amount of
labor time used in its production. In addition he believes in a differential rent theory.
Wages are determined by the wage fund, and hover at subsistence level. Profits are
the residual that remain after both wages and rent have been paid out. In the
progression of society, production is carried out on progressively worse land, resulting
in higher labor intensities, and higher rent. The consequence is that profits must fall.
Ricardo's theory of interest can be considered weak because he only discusses
profit, and not loan interest. In addition, he fails to account for why profits even exist.
Discussion of Interest Theories
Introduction
Most classical writers are similar in that they generally consider the rate of
loan interest a function of the supply of and demand for loanable funds. In addition
they believe that as society progresses, the trend is for the rate of profit to fall.
Prior to writing The Positive Theory of Capital, Bohm Bawerk completed
Capital and Interest, a comprehensive survey of interest theories, and critiques of these
theories. He categorizes writers into groups based on how they account for the reason
interest is paid, or in other words, its origin.
I wish to discuss these different classifications of interest theories, along with
some of the writers who fit into each category. Using Bohm Bawerk's classification
system as a base, I wish to discuss five different types of interest theories. These
include the productivity theories, use theories, remuneration theories, exploitation
theories and what I term the marginal theories. '^
The Productivity Theories
Productivity theorists believe that profit is the return paid to capital because
when capital is used, a surplus is created. In other words, more can be produced when
capital is utilized as a factor of production, and thus should be rewarded. The profit
goes to the owner of the capital. Bohm Bawerk classifies the productivity theories
into two types; the naive productivity theories and the motivated productivity theories.
The naive theorists claim that the use of capital results in an increase in value.'^ The
9motivated theorists claim that the use of capital increases the physical amount of
goods produced and thus results in an increase in value.With both variations of
the productivity theory, the rate of profit falls over time because new technology
increases capital faster than the rate of population increase.
To illustrate the productivity theory, its originator'®, Jean Baptise Say should
be discussed.
Say basically uses Smith's Wealth of Nations as a model for his own Treatise
on Political Economy or the Production. Distribution and Consumption of Wealth.
However, Say's theory of interest is more coherent than that of Smith.
Like other classical writers. Say indicates that the rate of loan interest is
determined by the relative demand and supply of capital to be lent, and it fluctuates as
a result of different risk premiums. Loan interest exists because a money loan can be
converted into productive capital to be used in a business to make profit.'^ Thus Say
has not only commented on interest rate determination, but he has also given a reason
for why loan interest exists.
As far as profit is concemed, its rate is determined by the level of competition
within various industries. Say acknowledges that capital may be considered as
accumulated labor, but asserts this is not the reason behind why capital earns profit.
The reason for this is that "the profit of capital, like that of land and the other natural
sources, is the equivalent given for a productive service."'® Say is considered a
naive theorist because he does not clarify whether capital is capable of increasing
physical product, or merely capable of increasing value.
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The strength of Say's theory is that he has a consistent theory of value. Unlike
Smith, who strays between various value theories, Say repudiates the labor theory of
value, replacing it with a theory which depends on the demand for and supply of a
good, along with the cost of production.
Due to the fact that the motivated productivity theory is similar to the naive
theories, it seems redundant to discuss specific writers who advocated such a
theory.'^
From the productivity theory, three other theories of interest were developed.
These are the remuneration theory, the abstinence theory, and the next topic of
discussion, the use theory.
The Use Theory
As the name suggests, the use theorists claim that loan interest is paid because
money has use value, and the use value should be paid for. In other words, if a
person borrows money he can use it to either purchase capital equipment which yields
a profit when used in production or he can use the money for personal consumption.
The use theorists argue that payment of interest is required whether the borrower uses
the money in a productive manner or not.
Say, Herman, Menger, and Knies are often mentioned as the main proponents
of the use theory.^® I have placed Menger in a group which I call the marginal
theorists, even though he does resemble the use theorists. Since I have already
discussed Say's theory, I shall concentrate on the theory of Herman.
Herman is said to have taken elements of both Say and Storch and elaborated
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on ihem.^^ Herman sees interest as not only a payment for the productive services of
capital, but also for the use of the capital itself.
Herman's determination of the interest rate mainly depends on the relationship
between capital and labor.Total product is made up of labor and the use of capital,
and the value of the product must cover these costs. In Herman's system, interest
represents the exchange value of capital uses for labor. If for any reason there is an
increase in capital, or its productiveness, the rate of profits will fall and wages will
rise. If for any reason the number of laborers or their productivity increases, we will
observe the opposite result, a fall in wages and increase in the rate of profit.
Herman's conclusions coincide with those reached by the productivity theorists with
respect to why profits fall over lime. For both Herman and the productivity theorists,
profits fall as a result of technological improvements and an increase in capital. It is
easy to see from Herman's theory that the use theory still retains ties to the
productivity theory.
The Remuneration Theory
The second offshoot of the productivity theory is the remuneration theory. The
basic premise of this theory is that capital represents stored labor, and interest is a
payment for that labor to the capitalist who owns the capital and perhaps has
performed some labor. This theory originated in England, and two of its adherents are
McCulIoch and James Mill.^^ The theories of these men are not very different from
these other writers, however. For example, Mill adheres to the wage fund doctrine
and differential rent theory, and like Ricardo, profits are a residual that fluctuate
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inversely with wages. Like Say, Mill believes that exchange value is determined by
supply and demand, and is regulated by the cost of production. The only different
aspect of his interest theory is its origin.
The Exploitation Theory
The exploitation theory of interest accounts for interest as the result of a
struggle between laborers and capitalists. The capitalists, who own the means of
production, take from the laborers a ponion of their produce, although they expend no
energy in the production process. The laborer accepts this and works for the capitalist
because he has no other choice- either he works for the capitalist, or goes hungry.
Although there were many socialist writers who suggested an exploitation
theory of interest, Sismondi, Proudhon and Rodbertus, to name a few^, I would like
to discuss the theory of Karl Marx,
Marx has been subjected to a number of different interpretations, even by
Marxists. I present what I feel is the most widely accepted explanation of Marx's
interest theory.^
Profit in the Marxian system is a simple concept. What Marx calls "surplus
value" is the excess of receipts over costs. Capital is split into two groups, "constant
capital" and "variable capital", which represents the wage bill. The rate of profit is
equal to the ratio of surplus value to total capital. Costs are equal to the sum of
constant and variable capital along with an allowance for surplus value which is based
on variable capital. Likewise, the price of a good is the sum of constant and variable
capital plus an allowance for profit. If price is greater than cost, then profit is
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positive. Thus surplus value is in essence a markup on labor costs.
The rate of profit is determined by what Marx called the "organic composition
of capital." This is simply the ratio of machine costs to labor costs. If the ratio of
surplus value to variable cost, or what Marx called, the "rate of exploitation", is held
constant, then the rate of profit is determined by the ratio of machine costs to labor
costs.
The result of this theory is that in the long run, as with the classical
economists, the rate of profit must fall. There are two main ways in which capitalists
can increase their profits. They may increase the workday of their laborers up to a
point, and they can accumulate capital. Each firm has incentives to introduce new
technology into the production process and accumulate capital. This will result in
greater production than rival firms in the short run. In the long run, this incentive
causes the organic composition of capital to increase, and by definition, the rate of
profit must then fall if the rate of exploitation is held constant.
It may not be clear why this is considered to be an exploitation theory. There
are two main reasons for this. First, the capitalist is not producing anything, yet he
makes a profit. Secondly, the capitalist and laborer are diametrically opposed. Due
largely to the reserve army of the unemployed, the capitalist is able to extend the
working day of the laborer in order to increase production and profits.
Volume one of Capital includes Marx's thoughts on profit and value, while
loan interest is covered in volume three.
Marx believes that surplus value is naturally split into two parts, the return to
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the industrial capitalist (the profit), and the return to the money capitalist (loan
interest).^® Any increase in loan interestmust diminish the rate of profit, and vice
versa, ceteris paribus. In this sense the rate of profit sets a maximum for the rate of
loan interest.^ Given this scenario, the money capitalist and the industrial capitalist
are in a struggle for the surplus value.
The market rate of loan interest is a monetary phenomenon, set by the supply
of, and demand for money.^® In addition, the rate fluctuates depending on the
security and duration of the loan. Marx did not believe in a long run equilibrium
interest rate. He did concede that there was a tendency for the interest rate to follow
the rate of profit. This is because money is borrowed with a view to making profit
with it. Given the Marxist scheme, profit falls not only because the organic
composition of capital rises, but also because the banking system becomes more
complex, and the bankers gain control of the money capital within the system.^^
It is interesting to note that unlike most classical economists, Marx sees loan
interest as a monetary phenomenon. In addition, classical writers see profits varying
inversely with wages, whereas Marx sees them varying inversely with loan interest in
the short run.
The Marginal Theorists
This is a group of theorists that is untouched by Bohm Bawerk. I believe that
BohmBawerk fails to recognize a group of marginal theorists, because he believes
that he is the first writer to develop a coherent interest theory based on marginal
calculations. Instead Bohm Bawerk places those writers who advocate the use of the
15
marginal concept in decision making in other groups. For example, he places Menger
in the group of use theorists^®, while placing Jevons in a group that he calls the
"Eclectic," '^ I have placed Jevons and Menger in a separate group because they base
the existence and determination of interest on the marginal utility of capital. In an
attempt to validate my classification, I wish to discuss the theories of both of these
writers.
In Menger's system, the value of all goods depends on their ability to satisfy a
human want. Goods are split into two categories; goods of higher order, and goods of
lower order. Goods of higher order are used to produce goods of lower order. The
value of the higher order goods depends on the value of the lower order goods which
they create.^^ As a result the value of capital, or the interest paid for it, arises due to
its ability to satisfy human wants through the production of lower order goods. In
Menger's system, exchange occurs if the marginal utility of the good that is given up
is less than that of the good received in the exchange. This concept, when applied to
capital, means that the value of the capital, or its interest, must represent its marginal
utility.
Menger's theory of capital valuation may seem to be a breakthrough regarding
interest, but it should be noted that he is really only concerned with the determination
of value for different kinds of goods, and does not provide any substantial theory of
loan interest.
Jevons has what I consider to be a stronger theory of profit than that of
Menger, because it seems more complete. Jevons regards the rate of interest as the
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rate of increase in total product as a percentage of the total product.^^ In other
words, the interest rate is equal to the marginal productivity of capital. In addition,
Jevons states clearly his belief in the role of abstinence in the theory of interest.^
The last point wonh mentioning is that Jevons believes profit to be comprised of a
risk premium, capitalist wages, and loan interest^^, whereas Menger makes no explicit
mention of this, and probably assumes it.
I think that it is obvious that Jevons gave more thought to the problem
of interest than Menger did. But do not think that either of these writers have very
strong interest theories. This is probably due to the fact that they are the first writers
to apply the idea of marginal utility in determining value. The result is that they fail
to work out complete systems of production and distribution.
Conclusion
I believe that differing theories of interest are a response to the different
distribution frameworks of the various authors discussed. Their theories of distribution
and interest also depend on their theories of value. For example, Ricardo's theory of
profits as a residual are dependent on his use of the wage fund doctrine, differential
rent theory and labor theory of value. Likewise the interest theories of Jevons and
Menger are a response to their use of marginal utility to determine value.
All classical interest theories are similar in that profit and interest are
determined by market forces and must fall in the long run. The theories, even though
they reach the same conclusions, are different in that they account for the origin of
interest in different ways.
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CHAPTER III. THE ABSTINENCE THEORY
Introduction
Having explained the major types of interest theories, other than that of Nassau
Senior, I will devote the current chapter to the abstinence theory of interest. I will
first discuss those writers who, like Senior, believed in an abstinence theory, then
discuss in detail Senior's theory. A comparison of Senior to other classical writers
will conclude the chapter.
Abstinence Theory in Other Writers
The basic idea behind the abstinence theory of interest is that interest originates
because the capitalist needs to be compensated for choosing to use his wealth in a
time-consuming production process, as opposed to consuming it in the present.
Although Senior is given credit as the originator of the first complete
abstinence theory', there were other writers who also touched upon it in their writing.
Schumpeter points out that almost every writer since Smith mentions "abstinence" in
one form or another.^
Various writers have been associated with proposing a concrete abstinence
theory prior to Senior. Among them are Read, Bailey, Storch and Scrope.^ Of these
writers, I think Storch and especially Scrope did have decent abstinence theories. I
fail to find any explicit abstinence theory in Bailey. It is said that Scrope's theory is
an improvement on Read's", so I wish to outiine briefly the theories of Storch and
Scrope.
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As Bowley explains, Storch lakes the theory of his fellow Frenchman, J.B. Say,
and extends it to an abstinence theory.^ He starts by considering the return to capital
as a rent. He goes on to explain that this return is the reward for saving, or in other
words, a reward for abstinence. Bowley explains that Storch, like Say, only accounts
for the supply side of capital, and not the demand side. Bowley is correct that none of
them had explicit demand side theories for capital, but Say did realize that capital was
productive, which is the stan of a demand theory.
Scrope has what I consider to be the closest theory to Senior.*' Scrope
believes that profit is composed of interest, entrepreneurial wage, and a risk premium.
Furthermore, he believes that compedtion results in a reduction of profit in the long
run. Lastly, Scrope explicitly states that profit is "remuneration for abstinence,"^
Interestingly enough, Scrope's theory of interest was published in 1831, several years
before Senior's lectures on the subject.
Subsequent to Senior's exposition of the abstinence theory, other writers also
adopted it. Among the more well known are Jevons, Bastiat and John Stuait Mill.
Although I have placed Jevons in a group termed the "marginalists", he
understood the importance of abstinence and simply transforms this idea into what he
calls "the endurance of want."® Bastiat is another writer who adopted the abstinence
theory. He states that interest is a payment for sacrifice on the part of the capital
owner. Bohm Bawerk points out that even though Bastiat received much acclaim in
his day, his theory of interest is a debasement of Senior's due to the fact that his
22
theory of value does not fit in with the abstinence theory.^
The last follower of the abstinence theory whom I wish to discuss is John
Stuart Mill. In my opinion, Mill repeats many of Senior's ideas with respect to
capital. Mill acknowledges that capital is used in production because it increases the
productivity of the workers.'" He also says that if a person uses his capital as
payment for productive laborers, he then shall claim part of their produce as
remuneration, this profit being the "equivalent of his forbearance."" Without profit,
there is no incentive for the capitalist to advance capital to the workers. This is just
the abstinence theory stated in different terms. Mill, like Senior, adopts a cost of
production theory of value, where the value of a good is determined by the cost of
wages and profit incurred in producing it. In Mill's system, wages are determined by
the wage fund (which he later recanted). Unlike Senior however, he believed that
population pressures and capitalist competition would inevitably lead to a situation
where the wages fell to subsistence level and profit falls to zero and capital
accumulation ceased. So although Mill adopted many of Senior's ideas, his
conclusions were quite different.
The Theory of Nassau Senior
Theory of Value
In order to understand Senior's theory of profit, it is important to first
understand his theory of value, production and distribution, as well as his elementary
propositions regarding the science of economics.
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Value Senior begins Outline of the Science of Political Economy by defining
the term "wealth" as all of those things which possess value (in exchange).^^ In
order for any good to have value, it must meet three requirements; utility, scarcity, and
transferableness.'^ Utility is the ability of a good to prevent pain or produce
pleasure, either directly or indirectly. The second requirement is what Senior calls
"limitation in supply""^ or what I have termed scarcity. According to Senior a good
in which the supply is limitless, may have use value, but it possesses no exchange
value because anyone who wishes to have it can get it himself. For a good to have
value there must exist some forces which limit its supply. Senior's third condition for
value is transferableness. In Senior's attempt to persuade the reader that economics is
a science, he has resorted to classifying all types of phenomena ad nauseam. This is
one such case. He points out that in order for a good to have exchange value, one
must be able to exchange it. To most readers, this must seem apparent. You cannot
exchange something which is not transferable. In concluding his section on wealth,
Senior points out that scarcity is the most important condition of the three, as it
influences people's love for distinction and variety.^^
Knowing that wealth is all those things which possess value, we must now ask
what determines value. In senior's system, value is a reciprocal relationship between
two goods which denotes the quantity of a good which is given in receipt for another.
Value is determined by the demand for a good and its supply relative to the good that
it is being exchanged for."^ Thus if apples are being exchanged for oranges, we need
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to know the supply of and demand for both of these goods. Anything which
influences the supply of or demand for apples (the good whose value we are trying to
determine) is termed by Senior an intrinsic cause of value.'^ Anything which alters
the supply of oranges, or their demand, is termed an extrinsic cause of value'^ The
main thing to remember from Senior's whole discussion is that the value of a good,
and thus its price in money, is determined by the supply of and demand for a good.
Senior's Four Elementary Propositions.
The next portion of Senior's system to be discussed are his four postulates
concerning the science of economics. The following four postulates influence almost
all of his ideas relating to production and distribution. I only wish here to list them,
explaining their significance as they become relevant later on. They are as follows:'^
1. That every man desires to obtain additional wealth with as little
sacrifice as possible
2. That the population of the world, or in other words, the number of
people inhabiting it, is limited only by moral or physical evil or rear of
deficiency of those anicles which the habits of the individuals of each
class of its inhabitants lead them to require.
3. That the powers of labor and the other instruments which produce
wealth may indefinitely be increased by using their products as the
means of further production.
4. That, agricultural skill remaining the same, additional labor employed
on the land within a given district produces in general a less
proportionate return, or in other words that though every increase in of
the labor bestowed, the aggregate return is increased, the increase of the
return is not in proportion to the increase of the labor.
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These four propositions are for the most part, self-explanatory, and need not be
explained here. I wish now to discuss Senior's theory of production, paying special
attention to the role of abstinence and the use of capital.
Production
In starting his discussion of production, Senior assumes the reader is ignorant,
and defines production as the creation of wealth.^® In the creation of wealth, three
instruments are used. The first is labor, any exertion of bodily or mental faculties for
the purpose of production. '^ The second is natural agents. These are any factor of
production which do not derive their productive powers from man.^ The third agent
of production is abstinence. This is, as Senior puts it, "the conduct of a person who
either abstains from the unproductive use of what he can command or prefers the
production of remote to that of immediate results."^^ It should be noted that Senior
has abandoned the terminology of those before him with regard to the factors of
production. What other writers call land, he calls natural agents. He does this
because natural agents is a more encompassing term. Likewise, instead of including
capital as a factor of production, he renames it abstinence. He notes that:
By the word abstinence, we wish to express that agent, distinct from
labor and the agency of nature, the concurrence of which is necessary to
the existence of capital and which stands in the same relation to profit
as labor does to wages.^
He does not include capital as a factor of producuon and renames the third
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factor of production as abstinence for many reasons. First, he understands the
difficulty in defining precisely the term capital. Secondly, capital is an article of
wealth which comes about from the exertion of labor, thus it is not really an original
factor of production. The third reason he uses the term abstinence is because it
implies more than just the mere labor of saving. There is a sense of self-denial as
capital is used for distant results". Lastly, by terming abstinence as a factor of
production, he is able to justify the payment of profit to the deserving factor.
In Senior's system, abstinence, which achieves the creation of capital, results in
the more efficient use of labor and natural agents. Likewise, capital needs the other
factors of production to be productive, it is not productive in and of itself. Abstinence
is productive when combined with labor and natural agents for two main reasons.
The first reason is that abstinence results in what Senior calls "the use of
implements."^® Abstinence, in other words, results in the use of tools which allow
for labor to physically produce more goods. In an interesting aside, Senior points out,
in error I believe, that a savage in the rude state of society who builds a bow and
arrow to aid in hunting practices no abstinence because the time spent in building
these implements could not be used in obtaining immediate enjoyment anyway." Of
course if it took one day to build the bow and arrow, the savage must have saved up
one days worth of food, so he could eat during the day that he spent building the bow
and arrow.
Secondly, abstinence, or the use of capital, results in the division of labor.^®
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The result is that laborers are more productive. Senior says that in the rude state of
society, men produce all goods for themselves. But once abstinence takes place,
implements are created, and it is these implements which give rise to the division of
labor.
This discussion of abstinence and capital has a strong relationship to Senior*s
third and fourth elementary propositions mentioned above. The third proposition
basically states that products which are the result of the factors of producrion can be
used to increase production indefinitely. The fourth proposition outlines the
Malthusian idea that there are diminishing returns in agriculture. In addition, Senior
adds in explaining the fourth proposition that "Additional labor when employed in
manufactures is more, when employed in agriculture is less, efficient in proportion." '^
Both of these propositions suggest that there are increasing returns in manufacturing.
This all seems to indicate that Senior not only supported an abstinence theory of
profit, but also supported a productivity theory, which was discussed in the preceding
chapter.
The next question to answer is how production relates to price. Senior believes
that the cost of production is the sum of the cost of labor to the cost of abstinence.^"
If the price of a good,- determined by its supply and demand, is less than the cost of
production, there is no incentive to produce the good. Thus supply is limited by the
cost of production. In the case of perfect competition, there is a long run tendency for
the cost of production to equal price. '^ Senior points out that most goods are not
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produced under this case of perfect competition, however. In this case the cost of
production is usually less than the price, due to some degree of monopoly power.^^
The excess of price over cost represents a rent which then goes to the monopolized
element" Having discussed production, and how its cost relates to price, the next
step is to discuss how relative shares of produce are distributed to the factors of
production, focusing especially on profit.
Distribution
Senior divides society into three classes; the proprietors of natural agents, the
laborers, and the capitalists. Each of these classes perform different functions in
society and thus receive remuneration for that function. The first group to discuss are
the laborers and the payment of wages.
Wages Senior acknowledges that it is difficult to define wages. Often times
wages and profit may be confounded with each other.^"^ In addition, it is ambiguous
as to the true meaning when wages are termed high or low. He defines wages as a
payment to labor for the exertion of body and mind. He says that when speaking of
high or low wages, there may be three different meanings intended. High or low
wages may be used to describe money wages, real wages, or the total payment of
wages relative to the total receipts of the capitalist.By doing this. Senior points
out the inaccuracy of Ricardo's statement that the only thing that can lower profits are
a rise in wages. In fact the amount of real wages and profits paid may increase in
absolute amount while their proportion is the same. Although Senior did not believe
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that wages had to hover at subsistence level, he did believe in the wage fund doctrine
as did other classical economists. In support of the wage fund doctrine he states:
The proximate cause appears to be clear, the quantity and quality of the
commodities obtained by each laboring family during a year must
depend on the quantity and quality of commodities directly or indirecdy
appropriated to the use of the laboring population compared to the
number of laboring families.'^
Having slated his version of the wage fund theory, Senior is quick to point out
many misconceptions regarding the wage fund theoryHe goes on to explain that
there are two factors which alter the size of the fund^".
The first of these factors is the productivity of the laborers who produce goods
destined for use by the laboring families. The second is the proportion of laborers
who produce goods for the laboring class as compared to the total number of laborers.
The more productive the workers, or the greater is the proportion who produce goods
for the laboring class, the bigger the wage fund. The productivity of the laborers is a
function of four things. Productivity depends on the skill of the workers, the natural
agents and capital which assist diem, and the absence or existence of government
interference.^^ By stating this, Senior reinforces the idea that for production to be
efficient, capital, labor and natural agents must work in unison with each other. In
addition, he shows the interdependence between the three factors of production and the
remuneration that they receive.
The actual amount of wages in Senior's system differs from that of Ricardo,
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Malthus or Mill in that they do not have to be at subsistence level. High wages may
lead to an increase in the population, but considering Senior's proposition number two
above, the population is limited by people's fear of having wages lowered to the point
that they can no longer enjoy certain habits.
Senior is similar to Smith in that he explains there are wage differentials
between different types of employment. Senior says wages may be affected by job
agreeableness, trust, probability of success, constancy of employment, and the facility
of learning the business.'^ "
Although Senior criticizes other writers in their use of the term wages in
relation to the wage fund, and their determination of wages, he does adhere to the
wage fund doctrine. His exposition dispels myths concerning the wage fund while
stressing the imponance of natural agents and abstinence working in cooperation with
labor during the production process.
Rent Senior defines the term rent in many different ways throughout Political
Economy. As has been mentioned above, it can be defined as the difference between
price and costof production. '^ It may also be defined as any advantage which comes
about as a result of a peculiar situation or abiiity."^^ In a more general definition, he
calls it the remuneration to a natural agent."^ The use of the natural agent results in
greater productivity, and thus it is paid rent. This definition is the focus of the current
discussion.
Senior's theory of land rent is basically a recapitulation of Ricardo's
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differential rent theory, and there is no need in repealing it. Senior states that the
proportionate amount of rent depends on two factors. The first factor is what he calls
the "positive productiveness'"*^ of the natural agent. The second factor is what he
calls the "comparative productiveness"'^ ^ of the natural agent. This indicates without
a doubt his support of the differential rent theory. Any excess product obtained as a
result of using land of superior productivity becomes rent. This corresponds to
Senior's reiteration of diminishing returns to agriculture in elementary proposition
number four, mentioned above.
For the most part Senior has added nothing new to the theory of rent. He only
repeats the theory laid out by Ricardo, adding a few twists and comments of his
own."^^
Profit As in the case with rent, Senior uses the term profit different ways in
different situations. Earlier in this chapter, it is indicated that Senior believes that
profit has the same relation to abstinence as wages does to labor. However he also
defines profit as a combination of capitalist wages along with a payment for
abstinence termed "interest".**^ However he says if he was to divide profit into
capitalist wages and interest, it would be confusing because he would have to divide
capitalists into those who were inactive (similar to Marx's money capitalists) and those
who are active (Marx's machine capitalists). Thus to avoid the confusion, he defines
profit in following way:
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We shall continue therefore, to include under the term profit the whole
revenue that is obtained from the possession or employment of capital,
after deducting those accidental advantages which we have termed rent,
and also deducting a sufficient sum to pay the capitalist, if actively
employed, the wages which would purchase an equal amount of labor
from a person unpossessed of capital/''
If you have the revenue of capital and deduct from it wages of the capitalist,
and rent, the result is a payment for pure abstinence. He subsequently defines profit
explicitly as the remuneration for abstinence'^ '^ . So all he has really done is renamed
profit to avoid the possibility of confusion pointed out above. It seems to me that he
has strayed from the common classical definition of profit, and has made the situation
more confusing. In fact it seems to me that when discussing profit in most cases.
Senior intends it to be the summation of interest and capitalist wage, contrary to the
above passage, so when the term profit is used with regard to Senior I intend it to
indicate both the payment for abstinence and capitalist wage.
In discussing profit, Senior points out that its estimation is difficult. It can
only be ascertained with respect to a capitalist's past operations.^" He also divides
the causes which influence the rate of profit into two types. The first set of causes
can be seen as general rules which affect all types of businesses. The second set of
influences are those which account for inter-industry profit differentials.
In discussing those causes which affect the rate of profit in all businesses,
Senior feels the most accurate way to describe the rale of profit is to denominate it in
terms of labor command instead of money, because labor command may be a more
33
stable measure of value.^'
There are two main factors which regulate the rate of profit in all businesses.
The first factor is the percentage of laborers whose job it is to produce goods for the
capitalist consumption." The second factor which regulates the rate of profit is the
period of time for which capital is advanced.^^ In order to explain these factors
clearly, I shall repeat to a great extent, Senior's examples. '^*
In explaining the first cause, Senior sets up a model of twelve-hundred laboring
families and ten capitalists. Each capitalist has in his possession, 1000 quarters of
com which he advances to the one-hundred-twenty families that he commands.
Assume that one-hundred of the one-hundred-twenty families produce labor-class
goods (quarters of com), and the remaining twenty produce capitalist goods (casks of
wine). Within the first year, the capitalist advances to his families, one thousand
quarters of com. The group of one hundred families produce one thousand quarters of
com which can then be advanced the next year, and the remaining twenty families
produce twenty casks of wine, which represent the capitalist's profit.
Senior goes on to explain that if for some reason, the population should
increase, each capitalist would command more labor with his one thousand quarters of
com. If instead of one-hundred-twenty families, each capitalist had command of one-
hundred-twenty-five, he could employ one hundred of them in producing the thousand
quarters of com as before, but now he could have the remaining twenty-five produce
twenty five casks of wine. The result is that he has more profit. In the case of a
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diminishing population, the result would be just the opposite. If each capitalist only
had command of one-hundred-fifteen families, he would have to employ one-hundred
of them in the production of corn if he wanted to keep his capital constant, and thus
only fifteen casks of wine could be produced by the remaining fifteen families. Senior
as it has been mentioned, did not believe that wages were set at subsistence level.
However, if real wages were to increase, this would provide incentive for an increase
in the population, but not to the extreme Malthusian case. Likewise, in any case that
the real purchasing power of the wages of the worker decreased, this would most
result in a decrease in population.
From the above examples it can be seen that any increase in the productivity of
the workers results in greater profits. If, given the original example, the productivity
of the families increased so that only ninety of the families were required to produce
one thousand quarters of com, the capitalist could devote the remaining thirty-five
families to the production of thirty five casks of wine, and still end up with the same
amount of capital at the end of the year as what he started out with.
If the capitalists choose to do so, they could easily increase their capital, by
employing more families in the production of com. Thus if the capitalist has
command of one-hundred-twenty families and is employing one-hundred of them in
the production of one thousand quarters of com, increasing the number of families
producing corn to one hundred ten would result in eleven-hundred quarters of com, an
increase in capital of one hundred quarters. The trade-off is a reduction in wine
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production from twenty casks to ten casks, and this represents a decrease in profit.
Senior points out in the following passage, that as a group, capitalists do not
wish to increase their capital, due to this reduction in the rate of profit.
And as every permanent increase of capital while the number of
laborers remained the same, would under the supposed circumstances,
occasion a proportionate diminution in the rate of profit, it could never
be in the interest of the capitalists as a body to increase their capital. '^
Eventually straying away from the convenient model presented. Senior says
that capitalists do not act together as a body, but compete with each other. If one
capitalist is able to increase his capital, he can command (at existing wages) more
labor than the other capitalists, and his absolute amount of profit would increase, while
the rate decreases. The other capitalists would then experience a decrease in both the
amount and rate of profits^^. Senior mentions that capitalists may try to increase
their own profits by the use of machinery. The capitalist can employ some of his
workers in building machinery which then does the work of many laborers."
The competition of the capitalists to increase their own capital decreases the
rate of profit and increases the amount of wages paid to labor. However Senior says
that in the long run, an increase in population would most likely take place, restoring
wages and the rate of profit to their original level, prior to the capital accumulation.^^
The second factor which regulates the rate of profit in all businesses is what
Senior calls the time advance of capitaL^^ Simply put, the time advance of capital
36
is the amount of time that elapses between the advance of capital and the return of
profit. Senior says that there is no rule as to effect of the time advance of capital on
the rate of profit, but he notes that:
As a general rule, the average period is longer or shorter in one Country
than in another, in an inverse proportion to the general rate of profit.^
In other words, the lower the rate of profit, the longer the period of
advancement that is used for production. In a case of low rates of profit, abstinence is
a cheap factor of production and is used intensively.
With regard to the time advance of capital, Senior does not say much, but what
he says is important. It reaffirms the role of abstinence in production and stresses that
roundabout methods of production are more productive.
These two factors regulate profit in all types of work. In addition to these
factors. Senior mentions three factors which result in profit differentials between
various types of work. These three factors are the constancy of employment, the
probability of success, and the agreeableness of work.®^ It may be noticed that
Senior mentions these factors with respect to wages also, which I covered earlier in
this chapter.
In terms of the agreeableness of work, and its influence on profit, Senior
admits the influence is quite small. This is due to the fact that the remuneration for
abstinence, which makes up a large part of profit, does not vary much." Senior's
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reasoning for this is as follows:
For abstinence being a negative idea, does not admit of degrees,
excepting in the amount of capital from the unproductive use of which
the capitalist abstains, and the length of time during which he
abstains."
Senior does admit that there is a small variance in profit between different
kinds of work due to trouble and sacrifices separate from abstinence. Obviously, the
capitalist must be compensated for this type of toil.
The second cause of profit differentials between businesses is the variance in
the constancy of employment. With regard to wages, Senior says that inconstancy of
employment may reduce the payment made to labor, but there is a corresponding
decrease in the amount of toil. This is not so with the capitalist. If the capitalist's
resources go unemployed, he does not get a diminution in his toil and must make a
higher profit when he is using his capital for production as compensation.^
The probability of success is the third factor which may cause profit
differentials between businesses. Senior spends more time commenting on Adam
Smith's sentiments on this subject than he devotes explaining his own thoughts, but
what he says is easily summarized. As indicated by the following quote, he believes
that the greater the risk encountered in business, the greater the expected profit:
If we are right, this risk of enormous loss, when unbalanced by the
hope of enormous gain, must be compensated by an extra profit of
something more than its value.^'
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In summarizing Senior's method of profit determination, there are two causes
which regulate profits in all businesses. The factors are the number of and the
productivity of laborers dedicated to producing capitalist goods, and the time advance
of capital.
Conclusion
Having discussed Senior's whole theory, the question stands as to whether he
has presented us with anything new. To a large extent. Senior has taken Ricardo's
work and adapted it, incorporating the role of abstinence, which Ricardo recognized
but did not stress. Profits are a combination of interest and capitalist wage, an idea
introduced prior to Senior's work. The rate of profit in Senior's model depends on the
amount of total produce consumed by the laborers, or in other words, the wage fund.
This is again similar to prior economists, except that Senior did not believe in the
tendency for wages to fall to subsistence level. The rate of profits are forced down
over time as a result of competition between capitalists, again introduced prior to
Senior. The main difference between Senior's capital theory and that of his
predecessors, is his stress on the role of abstinence, and how the time advance of
capital influences the rate of profit. Abstinence is considered a separate factor of
production for which interest, a component of profit, is paid. This is in essence the
supply side of the capita! market. The fact that capital, the result of abstinence,
increases the efficiency of labor and natural agents, represents the demand side of the
capital market. The result is a capital market in which interest is determined by the
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supply of and demand for capital. The difference between Senior and other writers, is
the underlying reason behind what motivates people in the market,
Bowley attempts to separate Senior from the rest of the classical economists^,
but the fact remains that he used both the wage fund and differential rent theory and
held a real theory of interest, just as they did. As I said before, the only difference is
the logic which he uses to come up with his conclusions.
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CHAPTER IV. THE THEORY OF EUGEN VON BOHM BAWERK
Introduction
The aim of this thesis, as mentioned in the introduction, is to compare Nassau
Senior and Eugen Von Bohm Bawerk in terms of their capital theory, and evaluate
Bohm Bawerk's criticism of Senior. Having discussed the capital theory of Senior, it
is now necessary to explain that of Bohm Bawerk.
In The Positive Theory of Capital. Bohm Bawerk lays down his theories
concerning value, price, capital and interest. Bohm Bawerk, a student of Carl Menger,
is undeniably Austrian in his way of thought. With respect to his theory of value and
price specifically, he resembles Menger a great deal. Following the format of the
discussion of Senior, the discussion of Bohm Bawerk, begins with his theory of price
and value before moving on to capital and interest.
Value
Classical writers split value into two different types. The first type of value is
value in use. The second type is value in exchange. Feeling that this classification
system is inadequate, Bohm Bawerk devises his own categories of value. He splits
value into two types, subjective value and objective value. Subjective value is the
ability of a good to secure well being for an individual, while objective value is the
ability of a good to procure some objective result, independent of an individual's
desires.' Bohm Bawerk goes on further to explain that objective value is important
only in light of the fact that it is related to objective exchange value. Objective
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exchange value is simply the ability of a good to exchange for a certain quantity of
another good^. In other words, it denotes relative price.
In his chapter on the origin of subjective value, Bohm Bawerk formally defines
value as the "importance which a good or complex of goods possesses with respect to
the well being of the subject."^ Thus in Bohm Bawerk's framework, the value
attached to a good is determined by each individual, and is not identical with price.
In order for a good to be valuable however, it must be scarce. The ability of the good
to satisfy a want does not guarantee that it has value."^ This, of course, is a
foundation of the Austrian School. Bohm Bawerk furthers his theory of value, by
explaining that the value of a good is determined by the last want satisfied by the
good, or in other words the marginal utility. The last want satisfied by a good is
determined by the number and the intensity of the wants that the good can satisfy as
well as the amount of the good available.^ Or in other words, marginal utility is
determined by the scarcity of the goods and the wants which they satisfy. Through
this reasoning, Bohm Bawerk explains the "water-diamond paradox."®
Within the remainder of book three, Bohm Bawerk discusses the various
problems with estimating value in reality. Included are the cases of goods which have
more than one use, complementary goods, and productive goods.
The first case is one in which you have one good which can satisfy many
different wants. In this case, the value of the good is determined by the marginal
utility associated with the most imponant want.^ Thus if you have one piece of
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lumber which can be applied to three different uses, a house, furniture and fuel, with
marginal utilities of 10, 7 and 4 respectively, the value of the wood will be 10.
The second case is that of complementary goods. The case of complementary
goods can be further divided into three cases. In order to determine the value of
complementary goods, one must know whether the goods have substitutes, and/or have
other employments besides that within the group. In the case that a group of
complementaiy goods have no substitutes and cannot be used for any other want, the
good which completes the group is valued at the marginal utility of the whole group.®
Thus suppose, you have three goods, A, B, and C which as a group are
complementary and have a marginal utility of 100 and where each single good is
useless without the other two. Then if you have goods A and B, but don't have C, C
will be valued at the entire marginal utility of the group, 100.
A second case in the valuation of complementary goods is where besides
having utility within the group of goods, a good has utility on its own, and has no
substitutes.' Using the above example of the three goods,
assume that A, B, and C have marginal utilities of 20, 30 and 40 respectively when
used independently of one another. Furthermore, assume that used joindy, these three
goods have a marginal utility of 100. In a case where a person has in his possession
only good A, it is worth the 20 units of marginal utility, however if he owns A, B,
and C, he will value good A at 30 because of the fact that losing A results in a decline
of marginal utility from 100 (that of the group) to 70 (that of A and B summed)
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The third and final case in the valuation of complimentary goods is
characterized by the fact that the goods have substitutes and have multiple uses.'®
This case is more complicated than the first two, but it will suffice to say that
the value of such goods lies between the marginal utility gained when used as a
complement and the marginal utility gained when the good is used by itself.
Bohm Bawerk has gone through all this work in describing the valuation of
complementary goods because he realizes that when goods are produced, the factors of
production act in cooperation with one another.'' By solving the problem of
valuation^ he then can move on to describe the value of productive goods, and present
a theory of distribution.
Bohm Bawerk concludes book three with a chapter on the valuation of
productive goods. What he does here is restate the theory of fellow Austrian, Carl
Menger, in which the value of productive goods is determined solely by the marginal
utility of the finished product which they create. Given this theory, Bohm Bawerk
refutes the classical "cost of production" theory, which says that the value of goods is
determined by their cost of production. Bohm Bawerk does say that the value of
goods approximates the cost of producing them, but the classical theory has the
causation wrong. It is the value of the fmal good which deterniines the cost of
production, not the other way around.'^ In discussing value, Bohm Bawerk intends
to set the stage for book four, on price.
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Price
Having established that the value of any good is determined subjectively, by
each individual, Bohm Bawerk must now explain how subjective value relates to price.
Within book four, he discusses how price is formed in simple cases and then
generalizes it to a case of perfect competition. He concludes book four by explaining
how the costs, value and price are related.
In the beginning of book three on price, Bohm Bawerk states that the only
reason people exchange with one another is because they place different values on the
good exchanged'^ Thus in an exchange of a good between exactly one buyer and
one seller, the price is negotiated, and bounded by the subjective valuations of the
buyer and seller'". If the seller values the good at $2, and the buyer at $5, the
price will fall somewhere between $2.01 and $4.99.
In another simple case, Bohm Bawerk assumes that there is one-sided
competition, one buyer and many sellers or vice versa. In the case of one buyer and
many sellers, the price of a good is bound by the valuation of the two sellers who
value the good the least. In the opposite case of one seller and many buyers, the price
of a good is bound by the valuation of the two buyers who value it most.'^
From the above cases, we arrive at Bohm Bawerk's conclusion concerning
perfect competition. Within perfect competition, there are many buyers who are trying
to obtain the good as cheaply as possible, and many sellers who are trying to get as
much money for their good as possible. The buyers and sellers make bids based on
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their subjective valuations of the goods. Buyers who have very low subjective
valuations of the good and sellers who have subjective valuations of the good which
are high are bid out of the market by competitors until the number of buyers and
sellers are equal. The price is then determined by the range of the values of the seller
who values the good the most, but who is still included in the market, and that of the
buyer who values the good the least, but is still included in the market.'^
Bohm Bawerk adds that another way of describing the above scenario is by
supply and demand.^^ The equilibrium price is reached when the quantity of goods
demanded equals the quantity supplied. Bohm Bawerk then goes on to discuss the
factors which affect the demand and supply of a good, and thus the price. Bawerk
lists two main factors which affect demand. The first is what he calls "Extent of
Dennand."'® This is just the number of buyers. The second factor is the "Intensity of
Demand"^^, which can be further split into two parts. The first is the subjective
valuation of the good by the buyers. The second is the subjective valuation of the
money that must be given up for the good. According to Bohm Bawerk, the
subjective valuation of money is different for the rich versus the poor.^° Obviously
the greater the extent of demand, or the greater the value placed on the good relative
to that of money, the higher will be the price.
The supply side is identical to the demand side with regard to factors which
affect it. "Extent of supply" and "intensity of supply" '^ are the factors that affect
price from the supply side. The greater the extent of supply, the lower the price.
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while the lower the value of the good relative to price placed on the good by the
supplier, the lower the price. These conclusions concerning the factors which affect
demand and supply are the same that are reached by the simple cases presented above.
Now having discussed value, the costs of productive goods, and the
determination of price, Bohm Bawerk simply brings them together in the following
manner.^^ The value of a good is determined by the marginal utility of the good. In
addition, the value of the productive goods is determined by the marginal utility
associated with the final good produced. Also the price of any good is determined by
the subjective valuation of that good, or in other words it's marginal utility. If the
price of a good was greater than its costs, this would induce a greater number of
suppliers, which would then result in a lower price, and vice versa. Bohm Bawerk
states that there are two reasons, however why the price of a good does not equal the
cost of its production. The first reason he terms "Friction. Friction is simply used
to describe short run phenomena which alter the equality of cost and price. Bohm
Bawerk states that there are many such disturbances and that they exist in every
industry, making this law of costs, a law which is only "approximately valid.
The second reason that cost does not always equal price according to Bohm
Bawerk, is the lapse of time. Here the span of time between the start of production
and the completion of the final product alters the valuation process which results in a
differential between price and costs. Bohm Bawerk states that: "It is this second
disturbing cause which gives rise to interest."^^ This serves as a point of departure to
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discuss Bohm Bawerk's theory of capital and interest.
Capital
The first two books within The Positive Theory of Capital deal strictly with the
theory of capitalist production. In other words, Bohm Bawerk begins by defining
capital and then explains capital accumulation and its role in production.
Bohm Bawerk claims that the production occurs in order to satisfy our wants,
and in general, production can take two forms. The first form is that of direct
production. In this case, labor and the power of nature combine with the result of a
good produced immediately. The second type of production is what Bohm Bawerk
calls the "roundabout method,"^® In this case powers of nature and labor combine to
first create capital, which then aids in the production of the good. There are two
results of the roundabout method of production. The first is the fact that the
roundabout method under most circumstances is more time consuming. The second is
that the roundabout method enjoys greater productivity than the direct method. Once
explaining the two methods, Bohm Bawerk goes on to give a general definition of
capital as; "a group of products which serve as a means to the acquisition of
goods.Within the first book of the Positive Theory. Bohm Bawerk spends a great
deal of time discussing the historical development of the theory of capital. He
discredits some of the previous theories and praises others in an attempt to devise his
own theory, and thus at the end of book one, he systematically divides capital into two
parts. The first division is called social (or productive) capital. This consists of things
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such as productive improvements to land, as long as they are independent of the land,
productive buildings, tools or machines, work animals, raw materials, inventories and
money.^® The second division of capital is called private (or acquisitive) capital. It
consists of all social capital and as Bohm Bawerk puts it:
Those consumption goods which their owners do not use for
themselves, but employ by exchange (sale, hire, loan) the acquisition of
other goods, e.g. let-houses, lending libraries, means of subsistence
advanced by undertakers to their labourers, and many others.^^
With regard to capital accumulation and its role in production, there are many
important things to notice. The first of these is that capital in and of itself is not an
independent factor of production. Capital is created as a result of the cooperation of
labor and nature. Capital serves only as an aid in production to labor and nature. '^'
In failing to acknowledge capital as an independent factor of production, Bohm
Bawerk has broken away from the concept that capital because of its abilities receives
interest in the same way that land and labor receive rent and wages.
The second important thing to notice is that capital is, in Bohm Bawerk's
phrasing, "the symptom of a profitable roundabout production." '^ He uses this phrase
because in order for a roundabout method of production to be used, capital must first
be accumulated. Or to say it a different way, a person chooses a roundabout method,
and then accumulates capital before production starts.
The third and last important thing to realize with respect to capital and its role
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in production, concerns its accumulation. In Bohm Bawerk's system, two things must
occur for capital accumulation to take place. These are saving and production.
Saving, according to Bohm Bawerk is very important for capital formation. If a
community consumed all of the goods it produced, there would be no resources left
for capital. However, saving by itself cannot result in capital. Capital consists of
productive goods, and even these goods must be produced.^^ Thus far, Bohm
Bawerk has defined capital, specified its role in production, and explained its
accumulation. We can now look at his theory of interest.
Interest
Before dealing with the specifics concerning interest, that is, its source, and
rate, Bohm Bawerk provides some intuitive reasoning behind the existence of interest
in book five of The Positive Theory, titled "Present and Future"
As was alluded to in the above section on price, Bohm Bawerk asserts that the
lapse of time alters the valuation process in such a way that price does not always
equal cost. Furthermore, he believes this explains the existence of interest. Bohm
Bawerk believes that tiie lapse of time results in a higher value being placed on
present goods than that on future goods. The difference in values is interest. In book
five, he must prove that present goods are valued higher than future goods.
As proof of the fact that present goods are valued higher than future goods,
Bohm Bawerk offers what I shall refer to as the "three reasons."
The first reason that present goods are valued more than future goods, is
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because of what Bohm Bawerk calls the "different circumstances of want and
provision. This is just another way of saying that there is a choice between
present and future consumption. There are people who borrow in order to satisfy their
deficiency of wants, and agree to pay back what they have borrowed in the future, as
they believe they will be better off in the future. There are savers, who feel that their
future wants will be greater than the resources they have to satisfy them, so they save
in order to satisfy these future wants.
The second reason that Bohm Bawerk believes present goods to be of higher
value than future goods, is because man is prone to underestimate the utility which a
future good will give him.^ Bohm Bawerk splits this reasoning into three funher
reasons as to why man is unable to realize the utility which a future good will provide.
The first of these three is that man has an incomplete imagination with regard to
future wants." This would be characterized by the person who feels that he won't
have any future wants. Since he doesn't give enough consideration to the future
wants, he values them too low . The second reason for underestimating the fuuire
value of a good is he says, simply a "defect in will."^® In other words, the person
cannot wait for the future to come, therefore he overvalues current consumption
relative to future consumption. And the last reason given for the underestimate of a
future good's value, is what Bohm Bawerk calls the "shortness and uncertainty of
life."" What is meant by this is that since we are not certain that we will be alive in
the future to enjoy future goods, the utility gained from future goods is uncertain to
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us, and as a result they are not worth as much to us as present goods. Bohm Bawerk
uses the example of anyone who is promised a large sum of money on his one-
hundredth birthday would most likely be willing to trade the large sum in the future
for a smaller sum today.^^
The third and last reason Bohm Bawerk gives in support of his theory is in his
terms "The technical superiority of present goods." All that is meant here is that
present goods applied towards roundabout production will result in a greater number
of goods and thus a greater value than future goods applied to a less roundabout
method of production. If for example we have a time horizon of two years and we
can chose to either use present goods and engage in roundabout production taking the
full two years, or start production a year from now, using a roundabout production
method of one year, we should prefer the former, as it will result in more goods. It is
important to keep in mind however, that in order to avoid a production period of
infinite length, Bohm Bawerk assumes the existence of diminishing marginal
productivity. Thus each lengthening of the production period results at some point in
smaller and smaller increases of output.
As an interesting side note and conclusion to Bohm Bawerk's argument, it
should be pointed out that he believes that the first two reasons may act in conjunction
with one another, and result in a cumulative effect. In addition, he believed that the
technical superiority of present goods could result in a positive rate of interest, even in
the absence of the other two reasons."*®
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Thus far, Bohm Bawerk has attempted to show that there is a difference in
value between present and future goods. Within book six, titled "The Source of
Interest", he attempts to prove this. In doing .so, he proceeds to explain various cases
in which interest appears, and shows why the interest appears.
The first of these cases is interest which results from a loan. This is the
simplest of cases and does not need much explanation. A loan, as Bohm Bawerk
slates, is "a real and true exchange of present goods for future goods.'" '^ Thus the
person who borrows 100 dollars in the present cannot simply pay back 100 dollars in
the future. The value of the 100 present dollars is greater than that of the 100 future
dollars and thus he must pay more than 100 dollars back in the future, or as Bohm
Bawerk terms it, "an agio.'"^^ Bohm Bawerk points out that the key difference
between this theory and the use theory, is that with the agio theory, present goods are
exchanged for future goods which may or may not be similar. The use theorists see
the exchange as entailing the same goods, as if the goods were merely borrowed for a
period of time. With the agio theory, the agio arises as a result of different valuations,
not as a payment for use Bohm Bawerk also points out the theoretical possibility
of a case where the agio is absent, such as the case of a friendly loan, or negative, in
which future goods are valued higher than present goods because of a possible change
in supply and demand.'^
Having gone over the simple case of loan interest, Bohm Bawerk now
addresses the phenomenon of interest as it arises from capitalist production. The
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capitalist takes a group of productive instruments, such as labor, raw materials, tools
etc., and converts them to future goods over time. This group of goods, although they
exist in the present, are not present goods, and cannot satisfy human want. They must
be converted into future goods before they can satisfy human want and thus they are
valued in the same way that future goods are. Thus these goods destined for the
production of future consumption goods are lower in value than current consumption
goods. This difference in value comprises the interest gained by capitalist production.
However, Bohm Bawerk must now prove his assertion that this group of goods (land,
labor and capital) destined to become future goods is less valuable than current
consumption goods^^.
The first good within this group that Bohm Bawerk discusses is the labor. He
claims that the wage paid to labor must be less than the value of the good which labor
creates. This is based solely on the fact that more roundabout methods of production
yield a greater number of goods. Most laborers do not possess the resources to engage
in roundabout production themselves, and thus are willing to work for any wage
greater than what they could earn if they engaged in direct (non roundabout)
production themselves. Thus the capitalist, acting solely on the third reason, can
employ the laborers in the production of future goods via a roundabout process,"*^
The result at the end of the roundabout process are goods which are greater in value
than what was paid to the laborers and thus interest has arisen. Of course if the
capitalist does not want to deal with the employing of the laborers himself, he may
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lend money to someone who does want to enter into roundabout production and
receive a market-determined rate of interest.'^^
• Bohm Bawerk uses similar reasoning in explaining the interest on durable
goods. A durable good is one which provides several services over time. The value
of a durable good is the summation of the values of the services it produces,
discounted to the present. Again, the durable good represents future services or future
goods, which are valued lower than current services and goods. Thus a machine
capable of rendering services worth $100 a year for the next six years is not worth
$600 today, it is worth some amount less than that. Using an example similar to
Bohm Bawerk's'*®, the value of the services may be wonh in the present $100 plus
$95 for the second year, $91 for the third year, $87 for the fourth year, $84 for the
fifth year, and $81 for the sixth year. The value of this machine today is $538.
Within the first year, $100 worth of service is produced and the other five years of
service ripen one year. The machine is now (i.e. one year later) wonh $451, the
summation of $100, $95, $91, $87 and $84, The machine has declined in value by
$81, which represents wear and tear, but $100 was received in service, and thus the
net interest on the machine is $19. Bohm Bawerk then generalizes this example to
explain land rent. Land again represents future goods and services, in the same way
that it was done with durable goods, the value of the land is the discounted value of
the services which it produces." '^ By generalizing rent as an interest on land, Bohm
Bawerk refutes Ricardo's doctrine of differential rent.^®
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Thus Bohm Bawerk has attempted to explain interest as the natural difference
between the value of present and future goods,
Bohm Bawerk must now explain how the rate of interest is determined. He
starts, of course, with the case of a simple, two-party exchange. In this case there is a
supplier of present goods, and a person who needs present goods. As in any other
case of simple two party exchange, the price, in this case the agio paid for present
goods, is simply determined by the negotiations of the parties. If the supplier of the
present goods has no other use for them then he will be satisfied by any positive agio,
but may be able to extract a higher agio depending to the circumstances of the
borrower. If the loan is a consumption loan, then the detenninanis of the upper limit
of the agio are the urgency of the demand, the probable provision of the borrower at
the time of repayment, and the shortsightedness of the borrower. All of these are
positively related to the upper limit of the agio paid for present goods. If the loan on
the other hand is a production loan, then the main determinant of the agio is the
difference in the return that the borrower can get by getting the loan. The bigger the
difference, of course, the bigger the agio the borrower is willing to pay. '^
Having explained the simple case of isolated exchange, Bohm Bawerk must
next explain interest rate determination within the complex market.
In a previous chapter, Bohm Bawerk explains what he calls the "subsistence
market". The subsistence market is the combination of the loan and labor market
where present goods are demanded. In the subsistence market, the supply of a
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nation's subsistence (its wealth) is used to maintain the nation during the period of
production, and as a result the greater the wealth, the longer the period of production.
The subsistence market basically decides the rate at which present goods exchange for
future goods- The supply in this market comes from capitalists who do not consume
all of their wealth. The demand comes from wage earners, independent producers in
need of credit, and individuals seeking credit for consumption.^^ Interest arises
because the demand for subsistence goods is greater than the supply. Within Bohm
Bawerk's framework, interest must exist. At an interest rate of zero, producers wish
to extend the period of production, and this increases the demand for present goods to
the point where interest is positive.^^
In the model that he uses to illustrate the determination of the interest rate, he
assumes for simplicity's sake that there are capitalists, who are the suppliers of the
subsistence fund, and laborers, who are the demanders of present goods. In addition,
the productivity of the worker increases at a decreasing rate as the production period is
extended. Equilibrium in the market is characterized by two conditions. The first is
profit maximization, and the second is complete absorption of the subsistence fund by
the laborers. In other words, the average period of production is extended to the point
where the subsistence fund is entirely absorbed by the laborers. There is no excess
capital which may bid up the wage, and there is no excess labor to drive the wage
down. In addition, there is maximization of profit per worker, which indicates that
there is no desire by the producers to lengthen or shorten of the average period of
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production which would result in lower profit. The rate of interest is in essence
determined by the surplus return of the last permissible extension of the production
period.^
Given this model, any alteration in either the subsistence fund or the number of
laborers, ceteris paribus, result in predictable changes to the interest rate.
If the subsistence fund is increased, the period of production will lengthen, and
the marginal productivity related to the extension declines. The result is a lower
interest rate. The same conclusion holds true for a decline in the number of laborers.
In addition, any productivity increase, ceteris paribus, will result in higher surplus
returns, and a higher interest rate."
Bohm Bawerk then goes on to explain that even though his model is not as
complicated as reality, it can explain interest rates. He then lists the main factors
which influence interest rates. These are: The subsistence fund, the number of people
destined to live off of the fund (including capitalists and landowners who live off of
their interest and rent), the marginal productivity associated with extending the
production process, and the intensity of demand for production and consumption
loans.^® Any decrease in the subsistence fund or increase in the number of people
living off it, results in an increase in the interest rate due to the fact that the period of
production must be correspondingly reduced in order to reach equilibrium. For the
same reason, any increase in the demand for loans will increase the rate of interest.
Bohm Bawerk also realizes that even though the rate of profit is equal in all industries
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due to competition, not all branches can use the same average period of production
due to differing marginal productivities associated with the extension of the production
period, but the model remains valid.^^
The model which Bohm Bawerk presents, seems strikingly similar to that of
the classical economists. The classicais believed that the wage was set by the relation
of workers to the wage fund and that interest was determined by the supply and
demand for capital. However, Bohm Bawerk claims that his model is different than
that of the classicais, basically because they ignore the element of time. '^'
Conclusion
Bohm Bawerk's whole theory of capital, as I see it, rests on his theory of
value. He believes that the value of any good is determined by the marginal utility of
that good. And in the case of a productive good, its value is determined by the
marginal utility of the final goods which are produced. In addition, he believes that
due to the "three reasons" the value of present goods must be greater than the value
associated with similar future goods. He uses this assumption to prove the existence
of a positive rate of interest. And thus, just as the classical writers had to develop
interest theories which fit into their theory of value, Bohm Bawerk has done the same.
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CHAPTCR V, BOHM BAWERK'S CRITIQUE AND ITS EVALUATION
Introduction
The previous two chapters of this thesis have been taken up with discussions of
the theories presented by Senior and Bohm Bawerk, In an effort to evaluate Bohm
Bawerk's criticism of Seniors' abstinence theory of interest, I think that it is
necessary to first compare the theories of the two writers. Once the writers are
compared, a complete exposition of Bohm Bawerk's criticism of Senior is given. The
last section of this chapter will evaluate Bohm Bawerk's criticism, and present some
ideas on how Bohm Bawerk couid have altered his criticism in a positive manner.
Senior and Bohm Bawerk Compared and Contrasted
I find similarities between Senior and Bohm Bawerk in several aspects of their
theories. The main areas in which there are similarities are in their theories of value,
capital accumulation, production, price determinadon, and lastly interest determination.
Of course there will always be differences between writers. One may touch upon
topics that the other doesn't, or one may have a more complete discussion of a topic
than another. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss many of the differences
between these two writers, but some are covered.
Value
Within Senior's framework, the value of a good is determined by three main
factors. The first is the utility of the product. The second is the scarcity or limitation
in supply of the product. The last is the transferability of a good. This last factor is
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really only a necessary condition for a good to have value; it does not have a role in
the determination of the goods value. So really there are two determinants of value,
utility and scarcity.
Bohm Bawerk believes that the value of a good is determined by the marginal
utility associated with its consumption. The marginal utility of a good is determined
by the number of wants which a good satisfies, and the number of goods available.
Thus for both of these writers, value is determined by essentially the same
factors, utility and scarcity. Senior has not of course spelled out the fact that value is
determined by marginal utility, nor does he emphasize the role of the individual in
assigning value, as the Austrian Bohm Bawerk does.
Price
For both writers, price is determined by the relationship between the supply of
and demand for a good. For Senior, price is the exchange relationship between two
goods. Senior believes that exchange value (price) is determined by the supply of and
demand for a good, which are basically a function of scarcity and utility, respectively.
Bohm Bawerk also believes that price is determined by the supply of and demand for
the good. The supply of and demand for a good are based on the subjective
valuations placed on the good by the seller and buyer. Equilibrium price is reached
when the quantity supplied is equal to the quantity demanded. The main difference
between Senior and Bohm Bawerk in the determination of price is that again in the
tradition of the Austrian school, Bohm Bawerk places more emphasis on the
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individual's subjective valuation of a good in determining supply and demand and thus
in determining price. Therefore an individual's valuation of the good can differ from
its price. Senior, although he realizes that utility and scarcity determine supply and
demand, does not address the role of subjective valuation. In his system price and
value are essentially one and the same, price being value in money temis.
With regard to price, the two writers are similar in that they believe that there
is a long run tendency for the price of a good to equal its cost of production in a
competitive setting. The main difference, as Bohm Bawerk points out, is that classical
writers, including Senior, believe that the cost or value of the inputs determine the
price of the final good whereas he believed that it was the value of final good which
determined the price of the input.
Capitalist Production and Capital Accumuiarion
Again, both of these writers are similar in their views on the role of capital in
production as well as the method by which capital is accumulated.
Senior believes that capital is accumulated through the cooperation of land,
labor and abstinence. Capital is therefore not an original factor of production. In
addition, the use of capital aids in the efficiency of land and labor because it results in
the use of tools and the division of labor which allow more productive methods to be
used.
Bohm Bawerk believes that two things must occur for capital to be
accumulated. These are saving, and production. Resources must be divened from
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consumption and then formed into capital which can be used for production. Again
the main advantage that capital affords, is the roundabout methods of production. The
use of roundabout methods of production are more productive, but are also in most
cases more time consuming.
As I look at these theories of Senior and Bohm Bawerk, I see essentially the
same thing, only worded in a slightly different way. Of course objections may be
raised, claiming that these two writers have different conceptions of various types of
capital, e.g. fixed versus circulating etc. However in my opinion, these differences are
trivial. I skip over them, believing that they do not affect the validity of the
conclusions reached in this thesis.
Interest
Of these two writers, I believe that Bohm Bawerk has outlined a more detailed
theory of interest than Senior. Bohm Bawerk believes that present goods are valued
higher than future goods and this difference in value represents interest. He supports
this by giving three reasons for the difference in value. The rate of interest is
determined in what he calls the subsistence market. The determinants of interest are
the size of the subsistence fund, the number of people living off the fund, the marginal
productivity of extending the production process, and the demand for consumption
loans.
Senior believes that two factors influence the rate of interest among all
businesses. The first is the relationship between the amount of capital within a
70
community and the number of laborers. Like Bohm Bawerk, Senior believes that any
increase in the amount of capital or diminution in the amount of laborers results in a
lower rate of interest. The second factor that affects the rate of interest is the "time
advance of capital". In discussing this, he says that the lower the interest rate, the
longer the production period that is used.
Senior's theory of interest determination is similar to Bohm Bawerk's in that
he comes to the same main conclusions as Bohm Bawerk. Both of them believe that
the greater the capital, the longer the production period, or the smaller the amount of
laborers, the lower the rate of profit will be.
In addition, I believe that some of Bohm Bawerk's statements pertaining to the
three reasons on which he bases the payment of interest are similar to sentiments
expressed by Senior. It has already been mentioned that Senior believes that the use
of capital is more time consuming and more productive, going along with Bohm
Bawerk's phrase "technical superiority." Senior also mentions that abstaining from
current consumption is one of the most "Painful exertions of human will" that may be
encountered. This seems similar to Bohm Bawerk's claim that man underestimates the
future as a result of a defect in will.
There are many recognizable differences between these two writers. The first
is that Senior discusses those forces which result in different profit rates because of
industry characteristics, whereas Bohm Bawerk does not. Secondly, Bohm Bawerk
includes consumption loans as a factor which can influence interest rates, whereas
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Senior does not. The main idea of Bohm Bawerk's whole argument is that there is a
change in value over time, and that interest, which is really equal to the marginal
productivity of capital, is this difference in value. It is simple reasoning, and it rests
on, again, the Austrian emphasis on value.
Senior bases his theory of the determination of interest rates largely on the
work done by classical writers before him. It should be noted that he does place
emphasis on the element of time in production, but he is not able to explain how the
period of production influences the rate of interest, he just asserts thai there is a
relationship between the two. Senior does not explain, as Bohm Bawerk does, the
mechanisms by which equilibria in both the labor and capital market are reached. And
thus even though these two writers end up with basically the same conclusions
regarding wage and profit determination, Bohm Bawerk's explanation seems to me to
be a more complete one.
The main point to be made from comparing these two writers is that although
they come from different schools of thought, the conclusions that they arrive at with
regard to value, price, capital and interest are strikingly similar.
Bohm Bawerk's Criticism of Senior
Volume I of Bohm Bawerk's Capital and Interest provides a comprehensive
history of interest theories, along with criticisms of each theory. He begins this
volume by discussing what he calls the "Theoretical" problem of interest and the
"Social" problem of interest. The theoretical problem deals with the origin of interest,
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while the social problem deals with whether interest should be paid.' After
explaining that it is his goal to investigate only the theoretical problem of interest, he
starts to systematically list and critique the various interest theories that I have
discussed earlier. It is here that he lays out his main criticisms of Senior's abstinence
theory.
Prior to discussing Bohm Bawerk's critique of Senior, it should be said that
Bohm Bawerk praised Senior's attempt to put fonh a clear theory of interest. He felt
that Senior's work was superior to other classical writers, because he attempts to give
a coherent theory, and meets the problem of interest head on instead of avoiding it.^
For the sake of completeness, three arguments that Bohm Bawerk makes
against Senior's abstinence theory are discussed, even though he believes that only two
of the arguments are essential in order to discredit the abstinence theory.
The first of these criticisms is that the rate of interest is not a function of the degree of
abstinence occurring. Having put forth the thought that there is some abstinence from
immediate gratification that occurs in the accumulation ofcapital Bohm Bawerk adds:
But it is also undeniable that the existence of interest and its rate do not
exhibit the slightest degree of correlation with the existence and the
degree of the "sacrifice of abstinence."^
Bohm Bawerk did not consider this to be a main argument against the
abstinence theory, and in fact he borrows it from Lassalle. He includes it in his
critique of Senior, because he finds it to be persuasive.
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The second criticism, and one which Bohm Bawerk feels is crucial, is thai
Senior's theory is too generalized. As he puts it:
I believe thai Senior has taken a thought which is essentially correct,
and has based generalizations on it that are insufficiently discriminating
and excessively stereotyped. There can, to my mind , be no doubt that
the factor of postponement of gratification, which is given great
prominence by Senior does in fact exercise a certain amount of
influence on the origin of interest. But I do not think that that influence
is so simple, nor so direct, nor so exclusive thai we may say that
"interest is the wage of abstinence, and that's that.'"^
Bohm Bawerk then explains that he will elaborate on this within the Positive
Theory of Capital, which he does. Within the last chapter of book two, Bohm Bawerk
raises what I consider to be an extension of the aforementioned argument. He argues
that saving basically involves no sacrifice. Observe the following:
It may serve towards the settling of this controversy to remark that the
idea of sacrifice, of renunciation and thus of moral desert, need not be
associated with the conception of saving. There may be sacrifice in
saving, and it may be praiseworthy, but not at all necessarily.^
The last, and most crucial criticism that Bohm Bawerk makes is that Senior
makes an error in counting abstinence as a separate factor from the labor sacrificed in
production. He says:
For I consider it an error in logic to present the renunciation of
gratification, or abstinence in the abstract, as a second and independent
sacrifice, apart from the labor that is sacrificed in production.^
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I believe that Bohm Bawerk has formulated this objection based on the
following quote from Senior, found in Outline of the Science of Political Economy:
Attention is usually drawn to abstinence only when it is not united with
labor. It is recognized instantly in the conduct of a man who allows a
tree or a domestic animal to attain its full growth; but it is less obvious
when he plants the sapling or sows the seed com. The observer's
attention is occupied by the labor, and he omits to consider the
additional sacrifice made when labor is undergone for a distant object.^
In an attempt to clarify his objection, Bohm Bawerk then proceeds to go
through many examples.® In the first he assumes that a man has two choices of how
to spend a day. He can either fish or hunt. If he fishes, the sacrifice made is
whatever he could catch hunting. He extends the example to one in which a man has
three hundred dollars to spend on either vacation or a rug. If he chooses the vacation,
the sacrifice is the rug only, not the rug and the three hundred dollars. In third
extension, Bohm Bawerk assumes that a tree is planted which will bear fruit in some
future time period. If the tree is destroyed by a storm later that same day, has any
sacrifice other than time it took to plant it been made? Bohm Bawerk asserts that the
only sacrifice is labor, and thus the amount of sacrifice does not change based on
whether or not the tree is destroyed in a storm or lives on to bear fruit in the future.
Bohm Bawerk believes that the magnitude of this one sacrifice, labor, is altered
by the passage of time. Since, present goods are preferred to future goods, a sacrifice
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of labor seems larger if it is used to procure future goods'
Evaluation of Bohm Bawerk^s Criticism of Senior
Before analyzing Bohm Bawerk's critique, it is important to reiterate some key
facts which make the analysis more coherent.
First, Senior believes that abstinence is an act by which a person forgoes
current consumption in order that he may engage in production which yields results at
some time in the future. Second, Senior believes, as I have indicated in Chapter Two,
that abstinence does not vary in degree. The only way that we can tell that abstinence
has occurred is that capital has been saved, and advanced for production. Lastly, I
believe that the origin of interest in Senior's system is the increase in productivity that
occurs when capital is used in time consuming production. Abstinence leads to capital
accumulation which results in a time-consuming production processes. I think that
Senior uses the term abstinence for twomain reasons. The first is that by using this
term he can easily attach a factor to a factor payment. Secondly, and more
importantly, he uses the term abstinence in order to stress the role of saving in capital
formation and justify the payment of interest to those who save.
Bohm Bawerk's first criticism mentioned above, "that the existence and rate of
interest do not have anything to do with the existence and degree of abstinence", is
partially true, but it is a poor criticism of Senior's theory. Senior did not intend to
prove that the degree of abstinence influenced the interest rate, nor did he believe that
abstinence was the origin of interest. As I have pointed out above. Senior believes
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that abstinence does not vary in degree, thus if it does not vary in degree, it cannot
influence the rate of interest directly. Of course abstinence results in capital
accumulation, and capital accumulation influences interest rates, but it is the amount of
abstinence, not its degree which influence the rate of interest. In addition abstinence
is not the origin of interest. Senior realizes that abstinence is useless unless aided by
labor and land to create capital. Capital is also useless unless aided by land and labor
in the production of other goods. Capital aids by making the production process more
fruitful. Thus it is not abstinence which is the origin of interest, but it is the prospect
of increased productivity through the use of capital which gives rise to the payment of
interest,
Bohm Bawerk's second argument is that Senior's theory is too generalized, and
that saving does not always require a sacrifice. In addition, he says that the delay of
gratification, although it may have some influence on the origin of interest does not
influence the amount interest directly. This criticismmisses Senior's point entirely.
In making this criticism, I believe, although he has not explicidy pointed out any
generalizations, Bohm Bawerk feels it is incorrect for Senior to assume that it is a
painful exertion of will for people to abstain from current consumption for future
results. Bohm Bawerk asserts within The Positive Theory of Capital, that money does
not have constant marginal utility. That is that the marginal utility of one dollar to a
millionaire is much lower than that of a poor man."^ The result of this is that Bohm
Bawerk assumes saving originates from wealthy capitalists who do not consume all of
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their wealth. He assumes that these savers, since they have an abundance of present
goods, are willing to put them into the subsistence market for little return, thus no
sacrifice is occurring. This can be seen from the following quote:
To the capitalist, the subjective use value of present goods is not greater
than that of future goods. In the most unfavorable case, then, they
would be willing to give almost 20s. present money
for 20s. obtainable in two years, or, what is the same thing, for one
week of labor which would bring them 20s in two years.''
It seems that all Bohm Bawerk has done is replaced Senior's generalization
that pain is felt when saving occurs, with his own assumption that saving comes from
people who hold such a low marginal utility on their wealth, that they are willing to
lend it for little interest. What Bohm Bawerk fails to realize is that not all of the
savers will be wealthy to the point where they could put their money into the
subsistence market without even caring about the return. Even for the wealthy, there
is some opportunity cost of saving as long as we assume that there is no possibility of
satiation. In addition Bohm Bawerk's criticism that saving does not always require a
sacrifice, can be interpreted as meaning that interest is sometimes paid to people who
endure no pain when saving. It seems that he is criticizing the theory simply because
the rate of interest paid to a saver does not always correspond to the amount of pain
that the person endures when saving. This criticism fails on many points. The first is
that Senior never intended for the amount of interest to be a function of the intensity
of pain felt when saving. Also, since, utility comparisons cannot be made between
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individuals, it would be difficult to ensure that each person was compensated in exact
proportion to his pain endured. This would be similar to saying that when a person
purchases a good he must pay a price that is equal to the value of that good for him,
leaving zero consumer surplus.
In saying that the rate of interest is not a function of the degree of abstinence,
and that capitalists hold such a low marginal utility of money, Bohm Bawerk is in
essence saying that saving is inelastic to the rate of interest. Although Senior's theme
throughout Political Economy seems to be that interest must be paid to encourage
saving the following quote seems to indicate that for the very rich, saving may also be
interest inelastic:
Now there is nothing to which a capitalist submits to so reluctantly as
the diminution of the value of his capital. He is dissatisfied if it even
remains stationary. Capitals are generally formed from small
beginnings by acts of accumulation, which become in time habitual.
The capitalist soon regards the increase if his capital as the great
business of life; and considers the greater part of his profit more as a
means to that end than a subject of enjoyment.'^
It is not exactly clear here what Senior means by all of this. I think that one
interpretation might be that as the capitalist starts out saving, a rate of interest may be
necessary for him to save. However as time passes, the capitalist saves only with a
view to increasing his capital, and absolute amount of profits. I think that the interest
payment probably still necessary for the saving to occur, but once the capitalist
becomes wealthy, it becomes less important. So, this passage has a somewhat
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different meaning than Bohm Bawerk's above, which says that capitalists save just
because they are rich, but the underlying idea that saving becomes more interest
inelastic as you become wealthy, is the same.
The last argument that Bohm Bawerk raises against Senior, and the one that he
spends most of his dme discussing, is that Senior is in error in counting abstinence as
a second sacrifice apart from labor. Bohm Bawerk believes that Senior is mistaken
because it is the passage of time which alters our perception of the sacrifice involved
with the exenion of at labor for remote results.
I find many errors within this argument. The first criticism is that Bohm
Bawerk*s examples do not clarify his point. Of course if a tree is destroyed, the same
day you plant it, you have lost nothing but the day's labor in planting the tree. This
proves nothing. If we modify his example, my point should be clarified. If we spend
a day planting a tree which bears fruit at some period in the future, we must wait for
the fruit to be produced by the tree. The production of the fruit takes place in stages,
until it reaches full maturity, and thus we can pick the fruit from the tree before it
reaches maturity if we wish. If we do chose to pick the fruit before it reaches its full
size, we are making a trade off between current consumption of the fruit, and the
consumption of a larger piece of fruit in the future. The reason we do not pick the
fruit in the future is that for some reason or another, we are not willing to wait for it,
or abstain from current consumption. Thus there are really two sacrifices being made
in the growing of the fruit tree. One is the labor expended, and the waiting that must
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occur before the fruit reaches maturity.
The second, and main criticism that I have against this argument is that Bohm
Bawerk is simply substituting his own expression for Senior's expression, thinking that
the two expressions are different. For Senior, the complete sacrifice that one
undergoes when choosing remote production to direct production is the sum of the
labor effort and abstinence. Bohm Bawerk says that the complete sacrifice made up
entirely of the labor effort. In the following passage he claims that the passage of
time exerts influence on the value of labor effort:
If we have the choice of expending our means of obtaining satisfaction-
and our labor is such a means, on filling an immediate need on one
hand, and a future need on the other, the attractiveness of the immediate
satisfaction will increase the difficulty of deciding in favor of the future
one. But if we do nevertheless decide in favor of it, we are prone to
measure the extent of the sacrifice we have made by the extent of the
gratification which we forego. And since the latter is invested with the
alluring character of instantaneousness, the scales will tip to that side
and make our sacrifice seem even harder than it would have
appeared.'^
Bohm Bawerk is saying that due solely to the preference of present goods to
future goods, labor effort which is used for future production seems to be a bigger
sacrifice than the same labor effort used for direct production.
Through an example, I hope to show that the sentiments expressed by Bohm
Bawerk, are basically the same as those expressed by Senior. If we represent an
hour's worth of labor as a arithmetic value of -10 and a year's worth of abstinence
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from current consumption as -3, under Senior's method, the total sacrifice of one
hour's worth of labor used for roundabout production taJcing one year would be equal
to -13. The amount is negative because there is pain involved both in working and
in abstaining from current consumption.
Using Bohm Bawerk's method, we would have the original labor effon, which
is represented by -10, but due to the use of the labor for time-consuming production,
the actual sacrifice is greater. It should also equal -13. Since in both cases, one
hour's worth of labor is being devoted to production taking one year, the total sacrifice
must be the same. It is just that Senior and Bohm Bawerk have a different way of
accounting for this passage of time.
It may still be argued that time influences the theories of these two writers in a
different manner. The influence of time is different in each writer's case, but the
difference is slight. In Senior's framework, the passage of time plays two key roles.
The passage of time allows for capital to be used in production as a result of saving.
In addition, the delay of consumption which results in saving represents a certain
amount of pain for those who save. Thus, without a positive rate of interest, saving
would not occur, and the demand for capital would exceed the supply. In Bohm
Bawerk's framework, the passage of time results in the ability to utilize roundabout
methods of production which are more productive. In addition, an agio is paid for
present goods because people are not willing to go without present consumption, even
though they may enjoy a very large amount of future consumption. Without a positive
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rate of interest, the demand for capital exceeds the supply. If people are willing to
pay an agio on present goods, this must mean that going without the present goods
must present some hardship to them. Thus non consumption results in pain for both
writers. The only difference is that Senior is looking at the influence of time, and the
postponement of consumption from the supply side and Bohm Bawerk is looking at it
from the demand side. However, as I have pointed out above, I believe that Bohm
Bawerk's assumption that savers do not make a sacrifice is not valid. He realizes that
those who demand loans, demand them because they are attempting to avoid the
displeasure associated with non- consumption, but he refuses to address the fact that
the same displeasure could occur for those who are the suppliers of capital, insisting
without proof that the first two reasons that interest is paid do not apply to them.''*
For the reasons oudined above, I think that it is evident that Bohm Bawerk's
criticism of Senior is not valid. I think that the main problem is that Bohm Bawerk
misinterprets Senior's intention. Within the next section, a commentary on why the
misinterpretation, as well as some suggestions on how Bohm Bawerk could have
improved his critique of Senior are offered.
Commentary
I have attempted to show that Bohm Bawerk's criticism of Senior, does not
accomplish its goal. I believe that in an effort to prove the superiority of his own
theory, Bohm Bawerk feels he must first discredit those theories of writers before him.
It can be seen from some of the passages quoted above, that Bohm Bawerk does hold
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Senior^s theory in high regard with respect to certain aspects. But I think the theories
of these two writers are much more similar than Bohm Bawerk perceived, and as a
result, he is unable to present a truly accurate critique. I think this error in perception
can, as I have alluded to, be traced to the fact that Bohm Bawerk is from the Austrian
School of thought, and thus has a slightly different perspective on things than other
writers. In addition, if he did feel the need to discredit other writers in order to prove
the superiority of his theory, this could also distort his perception of the theory, in
order to fit a preconceived critique.
Bohm Bawerk misinterprets Seniors usage of the abstinence argument. Senior
uses abstinence more as a way of justifying the payment of interest, rather than
explaining its origin. Bohm Bawerk repeatedly makes the mistake that abstinence is
the origin of interest, or associates the payment of interest with the degree of
abstinence. In my opinion, the best argument against Senior would have been to
criticize his justification of interest. But this deals with the social problem of interest.
Within The Positive Theory of Capital Bohm Bawerk comments that even though
saving is necessary for capital formation, it should not be used to justify the payment
of interest.^^ This idea in itself could serve as the basis for an effective criticism of
Senior's theory. If he could formulate reasons why saving does not justify interest,
this would seriously discredit Senior's use of the term Abstinence. Unfortunately,
Bohm Bawerk does not extend the statement any further, he is more concerned with
the theoretical problem of interest, rather than the social problem.
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Concluding Remarks
I think that it has been shown that Senior's theory is similar to Bohm Bawerk's
with respect to the conclusions that it reaches. Bohm Bawerk has unfortunately
confounded the social problem of interest with the theoretical problem of interest with
respect to Senior's use of the term abstinence. Senior uses abstinence to justify
interest, not to explain its origin. In order to present a critique which discredits
Senior, Bohm Bawerk would have had to address the social problem of interest, which
was not within the scope
of his work.
85
Endnotes
1. Bohm Bawerk, Capital and Interest, Vol. 1, 2-4.
2. Bohm Bawerk, Capital and Interest, Vol. 1, 181-184.
3. Bohm Bawerk, Capital and Interest, Vol. 1, 183.
4. Bohm Bawerk, Capital and Interest, Vol. 1, 184.
5. Bohm Bawerk, Positive Theory, 120.
6. Bohm Bawerk, Capital and Interest, Vol. 1, 184.
7. Senior, Political Economy, 59.
8. This discussion can be found in Bohm Bawerk, Capital and Interest, Vol. 1, 185-190.
9. Bohm Bawerk, Capital and Interest, Vol. 1, 187.
10. Bohm Bawerk, Positive Theory, 161.
11. Bohm Bawerk, Positive Theory, 330.
12. Senior, Political Economy, 192.
13. Bohm Bawerk, Capital and Interest, Vol. 1, 189.
14. BohmBawerk's whole discussion of saving on the part of the capitalist is in Positive Theory,
313-335.
15. Bohm Bawerk, Positive Theory, 120-121.
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION
Although Nassau Senior and Eugen Von Bohm Bawerk belong to different
schools of economic thought, I have attempted to show that their theories of interest
are in fact very similar. These similarities, along with what I consider to be a
misinterpretation of Senior by Bohm Bawerk lead to critical errors within Bohm
Bawerk's criticism of Senior.
In comparing the various interest theories that existed prior to Bohm Bawerk,
we see that many of them are similar in their conclusions. Senior and Bohm Bawerk
exhibit such similarities. For Senior the rate of interest is determined by the wage fund
and the number of laborers, as well as the time advance of capital. In Bohm Bawerk's
system, interest is determined again by the wage fund and the average period of
production.
Bohm Bawerk's main error in criticizing Senior is failure to understand
Senior's use of time. Bohm Bawerk believes that interest results from the passage of
time. He interprets Senior as saying that interest is the result of abstinence. Senior
uses abstinence not to explain the existence of interest but to justify its payment. For
Senior, the passage of time results in saving, and capital formation which lead to
interest. Both writers understand the influence of time on the existence of interest, but
perceive it in different ways. I do not doubt that Bohm Bawerk's exposition of
interest is clearer than Senior's, but I think that Bohm Bawerk fails to see the
similarities between him and Senior, and is unjustified in his criticism. As I have
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pointed out in the previous chapter, Bohm Bawerk could have presented an effective
rebuttal of Senior had he focused on the "social"
problem of interest rather than the "theoretical" problem.
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